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Behavioral Economics and Insurance: 








It is easy for a consumer to make mistakes in insurance markets, especially when deciding 
whether to purchase insurance against low-probability, high-consequence (LP-HC) events. 
They have a hard time collecting and processing information to determine the likelihood 
and consequences of these risks which (by definition) they have had limited or no 
experience.  Hence, people often rely on feelings and intuition rather than careful thought 
when it comes time to decide what coverage to purchase   
 
On the supply side, insurance companies face the risk of experiencing large claims 
payments, only part of which can be spread or diversified away through the law of large 
numbers if losses are highly correlated. Decision makers in the insurance industry and 
those who regulate, litigate, and legislate about insurance are also likely to make mistakes 
for the same reasons that consumers do — they rely primarily on their intuition rather than 
undertaking deliberative thinking because they have limited information from past 
experience on which to base their decisions.    
 
In this paper we take a realistic but optimistic view of the prospects for improving the 
functioning of insurance markets. Our primary goal is to specify, explain, and justify 
principles for structuring and governing insurance markets to account for buyers and 
sellers who make mistakes.  A secondary goal is to propose market and regulatory 
structures in accordance with these principles.    
 
We use two recent examples of legislation – the National Flood Insurance Reform Act and 
the Affordable Care Act – to illustrate how insurance could be redesigned to adhere to 
these principles much of the time—but not all the time.  These public policies are intended 
to encourage consumers to purchase insurance that they ought to have, but often do not. 
We also consider other possible policies designed to correct systematic examples of 
people buying insurance at high premiums when deliberative decision making suggests 
that it would be more appropriate to go without coverage. We conclude by building on 
these examples to suggest future strategies involving either the public and/or private 
sector. 
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Behavioral Economics and Insurance: Core Findings and Political Prospects 
 
According to insurance theory, those at risk benefit from incurring a small cost in the form 
of a premium to obtain protection against an event that could produce significant financial 
losses but that has a low probability of occurrence. If insurance can be offered with 
relatively small administrative costs so it is reasonably priced, a risk averse individual 
should prefer a smaller certain premium to taking the chance of experiencing a large loss 
(Arrow 1971). If properly designed and priced, insurance also offers incentives in the form 
of premium reductions for people who mitigate their risk in a cost effective way, if the 
insurer can accurately incorporate the impact these mitigation measures will have on 
reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of events for which they offer financial 
protection (Shavell 1979).  
 
There is considerable empirical evidence that many consumers fail to take advantage of 
insurance protection against losses of property and health, and do not invest in efficient 
loss reduction measures in the LP-HC setting. In both cases they fail to behave in ways 
that would not only benefit them personally ex ante, but might also enhance social welfare 
if there are societal concerns about people’s ex post wellbeing.  Behavioral economics 
offers some explanations for these decisions and suggests remedies. However, designing 
these solutions may require interventions by public and private institutions beyond just 
structuring information and options to take advantage of individuals’ decision processes.  
 
To illustrate this point, field and controlled experiments in behavioral economics reveal 
that consumers are sometimes more likely to select a default option rather than going to 
the trouble of opting out in favor of some other alternative.  These findings have been used 
to encourage consumers to choose options that are in their best interests, such as better 
(dominant) 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea 2001) and to adopt the “Save More 
Tomorrow” plans that encourage consumers to earmark a portion of their increased 
earnings into these plans (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). Default options have also been used 
to increase the number of organ donations (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) and in other 
programs detailed in the important book, Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  To date, this 
framing technique has been applied to situations where the outcome is either known with 
certainty, or when the chosen option (such as a recommended 401(k) plan), has a higher 
expected return than the other options.  
 
For decisions under uncertainty that involve insurance, the economic benefits of having 
coverage are reaped only when the (low-probability) loss-producing event occurs. It is 
unlikely that most people who failed to purchase insurance would reverse course if a loss 
did not occur, or purchase coverage even if insurance were the default option.  
 
In this regard, there is considerable empirical evidence that insurance behavior is guided 
by misperception of the risk, and the use of simple but inappropriate heuristic decision 
rules. Many who do not purchase property and health insurance perceive the likelihood of 
a serious event to be below their threshold level of concern. Individuals are often 
unwilling to voluntarily buy insurance coverage against a particular risk until after 
experiencing a loss.  Many who purchased a policy are likely to cancel it if they have not 
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made a claim after several years because they consider their insurance purchase to be a 
poor investment decision (Kunreuther, Pauly and McMorrow 2013).  
 
It may thus be necessary to utilize more stringent policy tools, such as premium subsidies 
or mandatory coverage, to induce individuals to protect themselves when they should have 
protection. Mandating insurance against losses from natural disasters or serious illnesses 
can also be justified from the vantage point of social welfare if the majority of citizens feel 
that those at risk should protect themselves financially before losses occur rather than 
relying afterwards on federal disaster relief covered by taxpayers’ money. Justifying such 
requirements politically has proven to be difficult given individuals’ lack of interest in 
voluntarily purchasing coverage against LP-HC events.  
  
As noted above, two significant pieces of legislation in the last two years have recognized 
the biases and heuristics utilized by individuals at risk and have taken steps to address 
them. The Biggert-Waters Act in July 2012 (112th Congress) proposed major reforms to 
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP); the Affordable Care Act (ACA) passed in 
2010 (111th Congress), is implementing reforms in health insurance to expand coverage.  
Both these Acts require consumers to buy coverage at reasonable or even favorable 
premiums while recognizing the need to make the purchase of insurance more feasible for 
low- and medium-income individuals; Biggert-Waters authorizes FEMA to fund a study 
on affordability of flood insurance by examining the role that means tested means-tested 
vouchers (in the same spirit as food stamps) and other financial arrangements could play 
in this regard.2 The ACA offers insurance to individuals and small groups through 
exchanges to be subsidized with means-tested tax credits.  Both Acts encourage the 
adoption of risk reducing measures. 
 
Other countries have also incentivized individuals to undertake protective measures and 
mandated the purchase of insurance against natural disasters and health risks.  In the case 
of natural hazards, in France, New Zealand and Spain, the government plays a key role by 
providing insurance coverage against all disasters and requiring those at risk to protect 
themselves with insurance (OECD 2008).  With respect to health insurance, all developed 
countries have compelled virtually universal coverage of catastrophic medically-related 
expenses, with financing through tax or tax-like instruments.  
 
Even so, challenges to such universal requirements persist in all countries. Mandates 
usually permit exceptions (for higher income people, for non-citizens, for certain classes 
of risk or types of medical care).  Public support for mandates in the U.S. is still rather 
weak, and other countries are having second thoughts about some aspects of their 
programs.  So it is clear that in a democracy, any normative theory will have to be linked 
to politics.  
  
Intuitive Thinking by Consumers, Insurers and Regulators 
 
For LP-HC events such as natural disasters, terrorism or catastrophic health-related 
expenses, not only consumers but also insurers and regulators often do not behave in 
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accordance with the normative theory of insurance theory but follow their intuitions. After 
a severe loss, insurers may refuse to continue to offer coverage against this risk because 
they focus on the losses from a worst-case scenario without adequately reflecting on the 
likelihood of this event occurring in the future. State insurance commissioners sometimes 
restrict insurers from setting premiums that reflect risk to address equity and fairness 
issues, sacrificing efficiency in the process.   
 
If decision makers were to engage be more deliberative in their thinking when making 
choices under uncertainty, they would likely compare alternatives by estimating the 
likelihoods of different events occurring and their consequences, and make tradeoffs 
between the expected costs and benefits of each option. 
 
The characterization of judgment and choice that distinguishes intuitive thinking from 
deliberative thinking builds on a large body of cognitive psychology and behavioral 
decision research. A recent summary has been provided by Daniel Kahneman in his 
stimulating book Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman 2011) as detailed in Box 1:   
 
Box 1: Intuitive and Deliberative Decision Making 
 
Intuitive Thinking, System 1 
 
Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no voluntary control.   
 
Uses simple and concrete associations, including emotional reactions or simple rules of 
conduct that have been acquired by personal experience with events and their 
consequences.  
 
Deliberative Thinking, System 2 
 
Initiates and executes effortful and intentional abstract cognitive operations when needed.  
 
Cognitive operations include complex computations and formal logic. 
 
 
Intuitive thinking often draws upon the experiences, expectations, goals and beliefs of the 
parties involved in the decision. Such sources and heuristics typically require far less 
effort than more detailed analysis of the trade-offs among the options.  Even when 
decision makers make an effort to think carefully, the intuitive appeal of some heuristics 
implies that they still make mistakes.  While intuitive processes often lead to reasonably 
good decisions, they do not work well for LP-HC events, either because of a decision 
maker’s undue focus on a recent event or because individuals perceive the likelihood of an 
extreme event to be below their threshold level of concern.  
 
Deliberative thinking with respect to assessing risks requires considerable time and 
attention and the use of decision tools such as probability estimation, Bayesian updating, 
and the use of formal logic. Consumers at risk would ideally make their decision on 
whether to purchase insurance – and if so, how much coverage – by comparing the 
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expected costs and benefits of a set of different alternatives available to them using 
models of choice such as expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) or 
decision analysis (Raiffa 1968).  If insurance premiums reflected risk and households used 
these more formal models, those facing an LP-HC event would purchase coverage. If all 
consumers at risk (rather than just a fraction of them) undertook deliberative (System 2) 
thinking, then flood insurance and catastrophic health insurance coverage would be 
viewed as highly valuable and would be purchased by almost everyone.  
 
Consumer behavior  
 
While intuitive perceptions of risk are relatively accurate over a broad range of situations 
where one has considerable experience, individuals are likely to deviate from expert 
assessments of unfamiliar risks that involve small probabilities and high degrees of 
uncertainty (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2004; Kunreuther, Pauly and McMorrow 2013). 
These events are subject to the availability bias where the judged likelihood of an event 
depends on its salience (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). There is thus a tendency to ignore 
rare risks until after a disaster occurs.  
 
This is a principal reason why individuals tend to purchase insurance only after a disaster 
and cancel their policies several years later when they have not suffered a loss and 
perceive the likelihood of a disaster as so low that they do not pay attention to its potential 
consequences.  An in-depth analysis of the entire portfolio of the NFIP revealed that the 
median tenure of flood insurance was between two and four years while the average 
length of time in a residence was seven years (Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne de Forges, and 
Kunreuther 2012). This behavior occurs even when homeowners are required to purchase 
flood insurance as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. 
 
The relatively thin market for catastrophic coverage is due to the unwillingness of a 
majority of buyers to pay a relatively small additional premium for essentially unlimited 
coverage. This may be the reason that 55 to 60 percent of private group insurance (which 
covers more than 90 percent of those with private insurance) contained some kind of 
lifetime cap on benefits before health reform (Musco and Somers 2012).  The choices to 
limit coverage of catastrophic health-related events for employment-based groups were 
generally made by employers or unions, not individual workers. These agents for the 
employees should have strong incentives to avoid mistakes but they still make them. This 
same mistake in insurance design has been made by the government for public Medicare 
Part A plan where there are lifetime limits for coverage of inpatient care.  
 
Such coverage limits seem irrational given the low costs and high benefits of protection.  
In a large insurance plan, very few beneficiaries would reach this upper limit, usually in 
the millions of dollars.  Those groups who self-insure could buy reinsurance at relatively 
low prices to cover the costs of these events.  The incremental premium to remove such 
limits is very low – less than one percent of what the insurer is currently charging 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009).  For example, if health insurance costs $2,000 a year, 
then removing the upper limit would add less than $20 to the premium. And yet many 
consumers ended up with coverage that did not include this low cost of added protection. 
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The recent reform legislation requires all new private health insurance contracts to 
eliminate such limits (Musco and Somers 2012). 
 
Insurer behavior  
 
It is easy to understand how consumers make mistakes about insurance. Surprisingly, 
insurance managers, despite high levels of expertise and strong incentives to make logical 
decisions, also make errors with respect to situations where there is uncertainty or 
ambiguous information regarding the low probability risks they face. When insurers have 
limited data and limited past experience with extreme events, there is a tendency for them 
to engage in intuitive thinking when determining what coverage to offer against specific 
risks and how much to charge.  
 
To illustrate, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, actuaries and 
underwriters, despite their mathematical expertise and experience, did not specify a price 
for protection against terrorism coverage nor did they exclude this coverage from their 
standard commercial policies. This implied that they were essentially covering this risk for 
the very modest add-on for unspecified events included in typical property insurance 
premiums. The failure to examine the financial risks associated with terrorism was 
surprising given the attempted bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing and other terrorist attacks throughout the world. This behavior by 
insurers is in the spirit of a safety first model originally proposed by Roy (1952).  It 
implies actuaries and underwriters do not focus on risks for which they perceive the 
probability of an event to be below their threshold level of concern (Kunreuther, Pauly 
and McMorrow 2013).  
 
Following 9/11, most insurance companies completely changed course and refused to 
offer coverage against terrorism, considering it to be an uninsurable risk despite increased 
buyer demand. The few who did provide insurance charged extremely high premiums for 
coverage (Wharton Risk Center 2005).  Prior to these terrorist attacks Chicago’s O’Hare 
Airport had $750 million of terrorism insurance coverage at an annual premium of 
$125,000. After 9/11, insurers offered the airport only $150 million of coverage at an 
annual premium of $6.9 million. This reflected an increase in the cost per dollar coverage 
of over 275 percent!  The airport was forced to purchase this policy since it could not 
operate without coverage (Jaffee and Russell 2003).  The Golden Gate Park in San 
Francisco was simply unable to obtain terrorism coverage at any price (Smetters 2004). 
 
If actuaries and underwriters had used estimates based on more formal models of choice 
that characterize deliberative (System 2) thinking for determining protection against these 
extreme events, they would have more accurately estimated the change in likelihood of 
future terrorist attacks in different parts of the country and their potential consequences. 
Insurers could then have determined what types and amounts of coverage they would want 
to offer and the prices they would have to charge so as to maximize their expected future 
profits based on their current portfolio of policies.  It seems implausible to us that they 
would have concluded that the likelihood of terrorist attacks took such a large jump as to 
call for the kinds of premiums just described. 
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In contrast, private insurers have been willing to offer catastrophic coverage for health 
insurance; its absence usually reflects inadequate demand by consumers as discussed 
above. Because illnesses that are financially catastrophic for patients are uncorrelated, 
even health insurers of moderate size are not concerned about a large loss relative to their 
portfolio from a single person’s high medical expense.  
 
Regulator behavior  
 
Insurance regulators have aided Florida homeowners in hurricane-prone areas by keeping 
property insurance costs lower than they would be if private insurers were free to charge 
premiums that reflected risk. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurers were only 
allowed to raise rates gradually over the next decade and were restricted from canceling 
existing homeowners’ policies. Moreover, political pressure from residents in hurricane-
prone areas to reduce homeowners’ premiums led the state legislature in 2007 to form a 
residual market mechanism, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, which offers 
premiums at highly subsidized rates, thus undercutting the private market. Today, Citizens 
is the largest provider of wind coverage in Florida.  There have been no severe hurricanes 
in the state since 2005, but if Citizens suffers a severe loss from a large hurricane in the 
coming years, it is likely to become insolvent. In this case, Florida will have to levy a tax 
on its residents and request disaster assistance from the Federal government. 
 
This example illustrates behavior triggered by short-term intuitive thinking by regulators 
and legislators. The strategy yields positive returns if there is no hurricane damage in 
Florida in the near future, but the current premium structure will lead aggregate claims 
payments that exceed premiums in the long run.  If regulators had undertaken a more 
systematic analysis of the long-term impacts of their behavior, they would not have 
formed Citizens in this manner by allowing it to charge highly subsidized premiums. They 
should have permitted insurers to charge premiums reflecting risk and found other ways to 
aid those residing in hurricane-prone areas needing special treatment. Just as low-income 
families are provided with food stamps to buy groceries, low-income residents could be 
given means-tested insurance vouchers so they can afford the higher risk-based premiums.  
 
Challenges for Making Positive Changes  
 
A key challenge in utilizing economic incentives for improving insurance choices is that 
they may be viewed by some citizens as being unfair or inequitable. Suppose, for example, 
the house that a homeowner purchased years ago is now categorized as being in a 
floodplain, or a family’s vacation cottage on the coast faces a greater risk of hurricane 
damage due to climate change. At the time the property was bought, damage from 
hurricanes and floods were not considered a problem. Or suppose some people’s current 
health status is adversely affected by past behavior or genetic disease propensities. 
Premiums that reflect their current property or health-related risk are likely to be viewed 
as unfair by the affected individuals who feel they are too high.  But for insurance to 
operate efficiently, it is necessary for insurers to raise premiums for those now facing a 
higher likelihood of a property loss or illness. Insurers would then be in a position to 
charge lower premiums to those that have low expected claims, so that purchasing 
coverage is viewed as an attractive option for this group.  
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If premiums do not reflect the hazardous location of property or adverse genetic 
conditions, insurance will be ipso facto subsidized for these high-risk individuals. They 
will have less reason to undertake actions to reduce their risk because they will not be 
rewarded with lower premiums. Another result will be that lower-risk consumers who 
undertake deliberative thinking will tend to purchase less insurance. In fact, they will 
likely run away from coverage if premiums are set higher than they should be, perceiving 
insurance to be a bad buy. On the other hand, the high risks will insure even small losses 
because they consider coverage to be a bargain. 
 
In summary, insurance is a policy tool that has two principal purposes – encouraging cost-
effective investment in loss reduction measures via premium reductions, and providing 
financial protection should those at risk suffer severe losses. A system of insurance where 
premiums are not risk-based fails to address these two objectives effectively. Insurers will 
have limited or no financial incentive to offer reductions in premiums to individuals if 
they undertake loss reduction measures. In fact, insurers are losing money on these 
individuals in the long run and would prefer that they bought coverage elsewhere. 
Individuals who are charged too high a premium are unlikely to purchase coverage.  
 
With respect to state regulation, insurance commissioners may feel compelled to restrict 
prices on those facing high risks because they rely on vocal consumers’ support; their 
desire for re-election may override their concern for the common good (Pauly, Kunreuther 
and Vaupel 1984).  
 
To address these challenges we propose the following guiding principles for making 
insurance more transparent, understandable and equitable with the dual objectives of 
improving individual and social welfare:  
 
Principle 1:  Require insurance against rare catastrophic risks.   Given the 
reluctance of individuals to voluntary purchase insurance against losses that are large 
relative to their wealth or income, catastrophic coverage should be required for all 
individuals who face this risk. 
 
Principle 2:  Premiums must reflect risk.   Insurance premiums should accurately 
reflect risk to signal to individuals how safe and healthy they are and to encourage 
individuals to undertake measures to reduce their vulnerability to illness and/or property 
losses by reducing their premiums. Risk-based premiums should also reflect the cost of 
capital that insurers must integrate into their pricing to assure adequate return to their 
investors. 
 
Principle 3:  Dealing with equity and affordability issues.   Any special treatment 
given to consumers at risk (e.g., low-income uninsured, high-risk moderate income 
groups, or inadequately insured individuals) should come from means-tested insurance 
vouchers financed by the federal government or at a state level through general taxes and 
not through subsidies generated by higher insurance premiums on lower-risk buyers. 
   
. Principle 4:  Multi-year insurance.   A multi-year policy provides stability of 
premiums since it prevents individuals from being reclassified into higher risk strata 
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during the term of the contract. Such policies currently exist for life insurance and long-
term care coverage. 
 
In the case of property insurance where only annual policies are currently 
marketed, a multi-year policy could be coupled with long-term loans for cost-effective 
hazard reduction measures.  The homeowner will be rewarded for undertaking these 
investments, inasmuch as the yearly cost of the loan is likely to be less than the annual 
premium reduction. State insurance regulators would have to allow insurers to charge 
premiums that reflect the reduced risk for those who take the loans and higher premiums 
for those who do not.  
 
Even before the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed, health insurance policies 
achieved multi-year premium stability by including guaranteed renewability at class 
average premiums as a policy feature.  Under this arrangement, insurers promise not to 
single out those whose risk rises for selective premium increases.  This gives the insurer 
an incentive to keep the insureds healthy, since the insurer is at risk for higher expenses 
that might be preventable. Guaranteed renewability also protects consumers from 
premium increases due to a deterioration in their health.  
 
The above guiding principles are embraced by the reforms to the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) in the Biggert-Waters Act. Given that the federal government is the 
principal provider of flood coverage to homeowners, it should be feasible to require multi-
year policies tied to the property, thus satisfying Principles 1 and 4. Given that many 
people cancel their policies if they haven’t suffered a loss, this requirement needs to be 
well-enforced in the future. Over the next five years, NFIP premiums on second homes 
and those subject to repetitive flooding must reflect risk (Principle 2). This will require the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to improve the accuracy of their flood 
maps as recommended by the Government Accountability Office (2004).  FEMA’s Map 
Modernization Program will result in digital format for 92 percent of the continental U.S. 
population. Land development and natural changes to the landscape and/or to hydrologic 
systems require continuous map maintenance and updates.  The National Research 
Council (2009) and the National Academy of Sciences is now undertaking a study of 
means-tested insurance vouchers to deal with equity and affordability issues (Principle 3). 
 
The ACA for health insurance, passed only after a major legislative and legal battle, 
embodies Principles 1 and 3. Insurance offered to individuals and small groups through 
exchanges is to be subsidized with means-tested tax credits (Principle 3). The ACA 
mandates penalties on those who do not purchase insurance to encourage the purchase of 
catastrophic protection (Principle 1).  However, the penalties are weak and may not be 
enough to induce low-risk people to purchase coverage.  The generous subsidies in the 
ACA should be enough to motivate the purchase of coverage by lower income people who 
undertake deliberative thinking, but the “outreach” (marketing) activities of the Health 
Insurance Marketplaces run by states or the federal government may also need to use 
insights from behavioral economics to address the problem of take-up of coverage; they 
need to frame the information they provide in a way that convinces people of the true loss 
probability and deters them from using the heuristics and biases discussed above.  
Specifically, it would be important to have a better understanding of why low-risk people 
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who could have afforded insurance did not purchase it because of imperfect information 
and imperfect understanding of insurance, and how they might be expected to change 
behavior as regulation increases their premiums but also imposes a mandate and markets 
coverage more aggressively. 
 
The ACA does not adhere to Principle 2, as it permits only very limited risk rating of 
premiums (restricted primarily to smoking behavior). Healthy younger people who are not 
of low income will correctly regard the premiums they will be required to pay in the new 
regulated exchanges as high relative to the benefits they can expect to collect, and no 
amount of truthful outreach may convince them to buy. There is also some modest public 
subsidy of reinsurance to offset the cost to those with high lifetime risks. Principle 4 
(multi-year pricing) is, as noted, already required for individual health insurance but the 
additional limits on risk based pricing in the new legislation noted above may attenuate 
the value of the feature, since protection against premium increases has no value if people 
can pay low premiums even if they become higher risks. 
 
Both laws exemplify much of what is needed to improve individual and insurer behavior. 
They are designed to move people’s behavior from intuitive processes to more 
deliberative thinking with respect to LP-HC events. The contentious and continuing 
debate over both pieces of legislation, shows that the policy process does not 
automatically or easily generate such corrections; there needs to be persistent and 
dedicated political leadership based on skilled use of correct principles. 
 
To be sure, both legislative proposals were directed at more than mistakes by insurers, 
consumers, and state regulatory officials that arise from behavioral biases and simplified 
heuristics. They are also designed to reduce losses and alleviate the fiscal burden on 
governments.  But correcting some of those mistakes affected the nature of the legislation.  
However, as noted, some of the attempts to improve equity distort insurance premiums 
and so frustrate other features in the legislation that were designed to improve the decision 
making process.  We feel that the guiding principles outlined above are lynchpins not only 
for improving the choice process between the insurers and the insured but also will 
encourage other stakeholders, such as lenders providing long-term property loans for 
encouraging those at risk to invest in preventive or protective measures, or health delivery 
systems encouraging cost effective prevention.  
 
Toward a Taxonomy of Government Interventions to Deal with Insurance Anomalies  
 
Property and health insurance are instructive cases for examining the rationale and design 
of effective government interventions, whether through insurance regulation, laws that 
provide mandates and/or subsidies, or nudges through reframing options that lead people 
to make better choices.  The flood and health insurance legislation are at the aggressive 
end of the spectrum as they involve heavy regulation of offerings and required coverage.   
Is this kind of heavy weaponry appropriate for other insurance anomalies that arise from 
intuitive thinking?   
 
We hypothesize that there are three features that suggest public intervention: 
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Feature 1: Anomalous behavior that involves under-purchase rather than over-
purchase of insurance or protection 
 
Feature 2: Anomalous behavior that causes large harm to a populations’ wellbeing 
that is of concern to others 
 
Feature 3: Settings where individuals have difficulty taking steps to reduce their 
risk  
 
Health insurance for lower income people fits all three of these characteristics.  Many low-
income people do not have insurance and the absence of coverage can cause serious harm 
to health because it inhibits the use of effective care. These families’ health levels and 
(perhaps) their financial status are of concern to their fellow citizens. Individuals are 
sometimes reluctant to undertake preventive health measures, such as their failure to take 
statin drugs after a heart attack, even when insurance fully covers the cost (Choudhry et al. 
2011) or not having their children vaccinated against contagious disease. 
 
Lower income homeowners present a similar case. Many of these families are uninsured 
because they cannot afford coverage. Few individuals in high-risk areas voluntarily invest 
in measures to reduce their losses from future disasters (Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel-
Kerjan 2013). If they suffer serious damage from a severe disaster, the public is concerned 
with their plights and there is sympathy (if not funding) so these disaster victims can 
remain in their current location rather than moving to a safer spot.  
 
When one or more of these three features are absent, the case for public intervention is 
weaker. We are usually most concerned about people whose use or consumption of some 
key good falls below some ideal level, not if it rises above the desirable amount 
(Feature 1).  Purchasing overpriced warranties illustrates the case where there is an 
absence of all of the above features, since the impact on the person buying the warranty 
and others is likely to be minimal. In cases such as these, intervention usually involves 
warning consumers, providing them with better information and offering them a chance to 
get their money back after second thoughts. We conclude that in situations where the 
consequence of excessive insurance is just wasted money rather than physical impairment 
or significant reduction in assets or wealth, it is not worth the effort for governments to try 
(often unsuccessfully) to correct such modest mistakes. Indeed, the loss from mistakenly 
buying insurance that is overpriced or unneeded is simply the cost of the insurance. In 
contrast, the loss in welfare from not buying needed insurance could be very high indeed.    
 
Risks (of any type) that primarily affect people in higher income brackets or risks that can 
be avoided that affect people across the income spectrum are also less likely to be 
candidates for intervention even if the consequences of under-purchasing insurance are 
large. In these cases, concern by others (Feature 2) is lacking. For example, if Warren 
Buffet, famously frugal, had decided not to buy health insurance before he was 65, there is 
unlikely to be a strong public policy interest in getting him to do so.  There are no health 
insurance subsidies for the not-very-poor, though there is a mild penalty associated with 
not purchasing coverage for the purpose of maintaining the risk pool so as to subsidize 
high risks as a matter of social concern (Feature 2). 
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Another example commonly cited as an insurance anomaly is the under-purchase of 
annuities.  People with accumulated assets should be interested in converting their wealth 
to annuities so they can maintain their standard of living for as long as they live.  There 
were proposals in the early days of the Obama administration from a Treasury official to 
reframe choices people make when they retire so taking an indemnity was the default 
option for 401(k) accounts.  And there is a great deal of academic literature in the subject 
that also points to framing as the cause of the problem—without explaining why the 
correct framing does not prevail in a competitive market (Kunreuther, Pauly and 
McMorrow 2013). 
 
The primary reasons for the lack of interest or enthusiasm for encouraging the purchase of 
annuities is that this is a problem facing the upper middle class elderly, who are not a 
population of major social concern.  Almost everyone has a compulsory annuity in the 
form of Social Security, and its benefits are usually enough to keep people in all income 
classes above the poverty line (even if just barely). Utilizing some of the limited stock of 
political capital to mobilize government to solve a problem that affects primarily people 
with six-figure incomes does not have any traction. 
 
The other example of under-protection is in the area of life insurance. Although most 
people do have some life insurance protection, they may buy too little and often make the 
mistake of dropping their coverage soon after purchasing it because they feel the 
premiums are too high given budget constraints (Gottlieb and Smetters 2013). Here again, 
life insurance is largely a concern of the middle class and above, and largely protects the 
bequests they leave to their middle class heirs so there is little concern by others (that is, 
Feature 2 is lacking) and hence no public intervention.  The availability of Social Security 
death and survivors’ benefits further attenuates the public policy motivation to deal with 
this problem beyond applying Band-Aids in the form of disclosure information.  
 
Over-purchasing insurance is another story. Sometimes people do so for good reason. For 
example, the partial payment of group medical and dental insurance by employers due to 
the tax advantages on group health insurance suggests that one should have more 
insurance than one would otherwise purchase. 
  
On the other hand, many people purchase more coverage than would be implied by 
System 2 thinking. The most prevalent case is deductible aversion: the desire for low 
deductibles. By undertaking deliberative thinking, one would realize that he or she could 
save so much more on the premium reduction from purchasing a high deductible on 
automobile, homeowners’, or individual health insurance when compared to the expected 
benefits in the form of additional claims payments should one suffer a loss.  
 
There are many hypotheses about why people make this mistake: they overestimate the 
chances of collecting on the lower deductible, they want to increase the chances of 
collecting on their policy so they can view insurance as a positive investment, or they just 
want peace of mind and freedom from regret. There are some serious puzzles in the 
literature regarding this anomaly. Many individuals do not make a claim on their policy 
when their losses exceed the deductible, which suggests they should have taken a higher 
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one (Braun et al. 2006).  If insurance markets are competitive, how can overpriced low 
deductible plans survive? Here again, there are few rules and few advocates for public 
policy to deal with this problem because purchasing a low deductible does not satisfy any 
of the three features listed above.  
 
Then there are some cases where insurance or insurance-like arrangements can be bundled 
with other products. Individuals often go for the bundle even when portions of the package 
are overpriced. Insurance for rental cars, appliance warranties, or the purchase of flight 
insurance all exhibit this characteristic. We could not find a single public policy initiative 
intended to discourage this behavior when these examples show that individuals clearly 
misunderstand the purposes of insurance (Liebman and Zeckhauser 2008).  These little 
mistakes in consumer purchasing just do not seem to rise to the level of social concern 
because they normally do not relate to behaviors that are of a concern to others 
(Feature 2). They are also do not satisfy the characteristics of Features 1 and 3. 
 
More specifically, there are almost no regulations beyond standard consumer protection 
rules that are intended to affect the usual cases of anomalous over-purchase.  However, 
there are some exceptions.  For example, the state of California does require disclosure 
that the driver’s own automobile insurance normally applies to a rental car so that 
purchase of additional insurance to cover the collision damage waiver may not be needed. 
(www.ehow.com/facts_5753168_california-regulations-rental-car-insurance.html).   
 
There is usually no requirement that sellers of automobiles or appliances that provide 
warranties hold reserves to assure payment of liabilities under those warranties should a 
manufacturer go bankrupt, although there are reserves and other insurance-type 
regulations for firms that sell “freestanding” warranties. (The United Kingdom does 
requiring a “cooling off” period after a warranty is purchased during which the purchase 
can be canceled (Warranty Week 2004).  And there are no rules to forbid the purchase or 
warn consumers of the rationale for not purchasing low deductible insurance if it carries a 
very high incremental premium relative to the actuarial value of the additional coverage. 
 
There have been some attempts by the U.S. Treasury to encourage the purchase of private 
annuities by workers with 401(k) accounts (Lieber 2010).  Explicitly requiring that an 
annuity be the default option, as proposed in 2008 by one Treasury official, did not 
become law, but in February 2012 the rules for 401(k)s were changed to make it easier for 
employers to offer their own annuity option to employees who might wish to convert their 
401(k), and to exempt payments for the “longevity insurance” form of an annuity (one in 
which annuity payments do not start until older ages) from the minimum distribution rules 
for IRA balances (Ellis 2012).  For life insurance, there are no regulations regarding how 
premiums can be set for multi-year term insurance. Hence, there is no protection against a 
buyer paying a high frontloaded premium and then dropping coverage because of budget 
constraints.  
 
Conclusion: in a world where the intrinsic imperfection of government intervention is 
both more in evidence and more frequently acknowledged than in the past, there is little 
call for policies designed to deal with insurance against events that mostly affect moderate 
risks for people in the higher income brackets.  
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Insurance When Bad Things Can Happen, But Not Often  
 
As already noted, insurers have had a difficult time maintaining a steady and reliable 
supply of reasonably priced coverage against losses that are rare but correlated, with 
terrorism and natural disasters as two  examples. Even if insurers examine past data in a 
systematic manner, there can still be a problem caused by imprecision in estimating future 
periods’ loss probabilities when events are rare and the world is changing over time. 
 
Consider the easy case where science and past information were sufficient to convince 
buyers of insurance, managers of insurance firms and insurance regulators of the true 
probability of the loss-producing event. To illustrate, suppose that one estimates that the 
likelihood of a flood next year is in 1 in 100 and that this probability will remain constant 
for the foreseeable future. Then there will be no disagreement by the relevant parties as to 
what estimate to use for estimating the likelihood of a future flood occurring. There are 
some cases that satisfy this condition where our mathematical models are so well validated 
and so unambiguous and convincing that experts are in agreement, like the return of 
Haley’s Comet.  
 
But what if it has been 50 years since the last Big Flood, and we know that the world is 
changing. For example, there are data on global warming and its potential impact on sea 
level rise but with considerable uncertainty surrounding these estimates.  In cases such as 
this one we cannot rely on either recent data and/or theoretical models to provide an 
assured, defensible, and unambiguous estimate of the loss probability.  
 
If insurers charge premiums for windstorm or flood insurance based on a low but positive 
probability of a damaging event, it is likely that there will be no disaster for years, in 
which case the insurer will accumulate enormous underwriting profits. These reserves will 
be needed to pay claims when a serious disaster does occur. But the general public and 
regulators may become uncomfortable upon learning that the insurer’s surplus has 
increased significantly from a series of disaster-free years, claiming that the premiums 
being charged are too high.  
 
As discussed earlier, Florida addressed this issue by forming a state-backed insurer 
(Citizens Corporation) that charged subsidized premiums. Critics have rightly noted that 
this arrangement potentially puts all Florida taxpayers at risk should there be a severe 
hurricane and Citizens does not have enough surplus to pay all the claims. In other words, 
an intense minority of (often high wealth) property owners residing in hurricane-prone 
areas are being highly subsidized by all the residents in Florida. 
 
There is another alternative: mutual insurance. Under this arrangement, if one subsidizes 
the premiums, everyone who purchases the insurance will be assessed if reserves and 
premiums are inadequate when a disaster occurs.  Collecting this assessment ex post may 
be difficult, so an alternative (in effect) is to charge higher than actuarially fair premiums 
but tell purchasers that a portion of their payment is being held in a fund that they 
personally own. Dividends can be declared if the event does turn out to be rarer than 
originally anticipated. In this arrangement, policyholders bear the full cost of their 
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coverage if an event occurs, but get money back if it does not.  In effect, they are protected 
with insurance sold at a moderate net price whether the probability turns out to be high or 
low. 
 
Supplementing the Guiding Principles in Addressing These Challenges  
 
The four guiding principles can be supplemented by utilizing approaches that alleviate 
some of the biases that constitute intuitive (System 1) thinking.  
 
In the case of buyers, we recommend that when presenting information on the likelihood 
of an LP-HC event occurring, one stretches the time horizon. Rather than saying that there 
is a 1 in 100 chance next year of damage from a severe hurricane, reframe the same 
probability by saying that the chance that one’s property will be damaged from a hurricane 
in the next 25 years is greater than 1 in 5. Empirical studies have shown that data 
presented in this fashion leads individuals to take protective measures (Slovic, Fischhoff 
and Lichtenstein 1978; Weinstein, Kolb, and Goldstein 1996).  
 
One of the biggest challenges is to convince consumers that if they don’t suffer losses 
from a disaster or incur health related expenditures next year, the purchase of insurance 
was not a waste of money. It is extremely difficult to get the message across that those at 
risk should celebrate not having collected on their insurance policy. One way to do this is 
to remind people that something serious could happen to them next year, so they should 
not cancel their insurance policy without good reason.  
 
Before insurers decide to pull out of the market or raise rates significantly after a serious 
loss, they should characterize worst-case scenarios and then assign a best guess probability 
to each of these events occurring and the uncertainty surrounding these estimates.  
 
Regulators should be appointed for limited terms, rather than being elected, so that they 
are less prone to be influenced by special interest groups, and have incentives to develop 
programs that improve overall social welfare.  Regulatory decisions should make clear 
who gains and who loses from these actions and why some deserve to benefit from a given 
insurance program and others should have to pay part of the cost of protecting others. 
 
Finally, providing transparent information related to the rationale for insurance should go 
a long way to helping the general public better understand this policy tool. Insurance can 
then fulfill the roles it is designed to play: reducing future losses and financially protecting 
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